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<allpages gapcontinue="Sheffield" />
<page pageid="15" ns="0" title="Re-drafted Contact">
<rev contentformat="text/x-wiki" contentmodel="wikitext" xml:space="preserve">= Groups and Contacts =
Indymedia UK was a network of groups and volunteers across the country. It split in two on May 1 2011, and this site is one of the fragments from that split. The collective that runs this site is usually known as the Mayday Collective.
You can get in touch with local groups and project subgroups, or check out the general lists for the whole site.
Please be aware that most lists are publicly archived, which means that anyone can read your mail online.
== Essentials ==
Please submit your reports using the Publish Page after reading the Editorial Guidelines.
If you are experiencing technical problems you can ask for help on the Tech list - please give as much detail as you can about the problem.
To take part in general discussion please subscribe to our publicly archived [https://lists.indymedia.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/users Users list]. But be aware most of running of Indymedia UK takes place elsewhere. The collective running the site has a [https://lists.indymedia.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/discuss Discuss list].
If you don't want your mail being read online for any reason you can write via our Contact list (see section "more contacts"). Only members of the list can read the archives.
This is the list to write to if you want to propose a feature for the middle column of the website. This list is also used to discuss proposals and make suggestions for improvements etc. Join this list to work collaboratively with others on preparing middle column features for the site.
This list is for reporting and discussing the moderation of the UK Indymedia Open Newswire at www.indymedia.org.uk.
Please post to this list if you have any complain to make about an article or comment posted to the site or if you would like a article or comment promoted.
Tech issues including tech resources, development, documentation and troubleshooting. Also co-ordinate work on templates for MIR content management system the site uses.
==Project Mailing Lists==
There is collaboration on several work lists. If you want to contribute to print, text, audio or other specific projects, you can contact the subgroups directly on their email lists. All of them are publicly archived. Click on the list of your choice to see details on its contact page.
Work list where video projects and public screenings (cinemas or other places) are worked on. More resources on the [http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/static/video.html video page].
Work lists for radio projects, broadcasting on FM, streams etc. More resources on the [http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/static/radio.html radio page].
==Local IMCs in the UK==
You can get in touch with local Indymedia groups through their email lists. Most of them are publicly archived. Some groups have their own Indymedia website on imc-uk or elsewhere, some are just developing. Click on "website" to check them out.
Bristol IMC [http://bristol.indymedia.org/ website] | [http://lists.indymedia.org/mailman/listinfo/imc-bristol list]
Birmingham IMC [http://birmingham.indymedia.org.uk/ website] | [http://lists.indymedia.org/mailman/listinfo/imc-birmingham list]
Northern IMC [http://northern.indymedia.org/ website] | [http://lists.indymedia.org/mailman/listinfo/imc-northern list]
London IMC [http://london.indymedia.org/ website] | [http://lists.indymedia.org/mailman/listinfo/imc-london list]
Nottinghamshire IMC [http://nottingham.indymedia.org/ website] | [http://lists.indymedia.org/mailman/listinfo/imc-nottingham list]
Oxford IMC [http://oxford.indymedia.org.uk/ website] | [http://lists.indymedia.org/mailman/listinfo/imc-oxford list]
Scotland website [http://scotland.indymedia.org.uk/ website] | [https://lists.indymedia.org/mailman/listinfo/imc-scotland-discussion list] | [https://uk.indymedia.org/en/regions/scotland/ legacy IMCUK Scotland subsection] |
Sheffield [http://sheffield.indymedia.org website] | [http://lists.indymedia.org/mailman/listinfo/imc-sheffield list]
More IMCs coming if people get involved to make them happen
==Cross-communication in the United Kollektives==
There was a time when all IMC-groups in the UK would discuss things together on several mailing lists. Some list remain:
Other lists have been archived:
If you want to get involved but this page isn't helping much in making up your mind, check out Getting Involved at global Indymedia. If you register to the page, a trust-worthy person (probably one of us :-) will contact you privately and try to give a better idea.
===The world's imc-mailing lists===
The global Indymedia project operates through a system of email lists, dedicated to geographical areas or specific projects. See [http://lists.indymedia.org/ the world's complete list of imc mailing lists].
If you don't want your mail being read online, mail to contact at lists.indymedia.org.uk to contact those that admin indymedia.org.uk. Your mail then goes to a privately archived list, only volunteers of imc-uk can read it online.
Also there you can email imc-uk-contact at lists.indymedia.org. which will go to admins from several Indymedia collectives in the UK.
Email, if not encrypted, should be thought of as a postcard. Even postings to private lists that are not publicly archived can be read by the authorities. For internet privacy tools check epic.org. Postings to publicly archived lists can be found through a search engine (like google) very easily. Try this Google search to see how Google indexes list archives.
To prevent spam, email addresses on this page are given in the format name at domain.org, not in the usual firstname.lastname@example.org format.</rev>
<page pageid="13" ns="0" title="Security">
<rev contentformat="text/x-wiki" contentmodel="wikitext" xml:space="preserve">==IMC UK Security Information==
===Browse using an encrypted connection===
Indymedia UK values the principles behind open-publishing and is working towards completely anonymous publishing of media upon the website. One of the things that you can do to help this is browse the web site using an encrypted connection: this helps disguise who is posting to the site at any given time.
===Why is this important?===
We have tried to minimise what information can be found out about posters. Currently, Indymedia UK does not log ip addresses. However, it is possible for someone to monitor individuals who are using the site and check which time they visited Indymedia UK. If this corresponds to the time a certain article was posted, then whoever is doing the surveillance may get useful information. One way of diminishing this is to ensure that lots of people are connecting at the same time - hence, any one of them could be making a post or merely viewing the site.
===What is an "encrypted connection"?===
An encrypted connection between computers is used to hide the details of the information that is being transferred. For example, many organisations use encrypted connections when making or discussing financial transactions: you have probably used one if you've ever booked a ticket or used the bank online.
During the exchange, a third-party is used to verify that the website is who they say they are. There are many big corporate companies who sell identification-certificates - and procedures for acquiring them may be variable; such organisations are known as Certificate Authorities (CAs). Thus, it can be difficult to know whether to trust them or not (although often, one does not have a choice).
Indymedia UK, instead of using a commercial Certificate Authority, has decided to use the non-profit organisation CACert (cacert.org). All our certificates are certified by the 'root' certificate of the CACert Certificate Authority.
===What are certificates?===
Certificates are used to verify the identity of people or computers. In particular, certificates are needed to establish secure connections. Without certificates, you would be able to ensure that no one else was listening, but you might be talking to the wrong computer altogether!
What is a certificate authority?
Certificates are the digital equivalent of a government issued identification card. Certificates, however, are usually issued by private corporations called certificate authorities (CA). Indymedia UK has, instead, chosen to use CA Cert (cacert.org), a free and non-profit certificate authority.
Unfortunately, you need to do a little work to get your software to recognize CA Cert as a certificate authority. Every CA has a 'root certificate' which identifies a particular organization as a certificate authority. Corporate CAs have their root certificates distributed with most of the major computer programs and operating systems, and are preconfigured in most web browsers. For CAcert, however, you need to manually install the cacert.org root certificate.
===How do I install the cacert.org root certificate?===
* IE users can use the Internet Explorer cert install page.
* Mozilla users can follow this link to the root cert and follow the instructions that pop up.
* Internet Explorer on the Mac is messed up, and requires that you use this link (provided by Riseup) instead: install root certificate using IE on the Mac.
Alternatively, you may wish to visit the CAcert root cert page.
Here are a few installation tutorials:
* Internet Explorer (windows)
* Internet Explorer (mac)
===What happens if I don't install the root certificate?===
Without the root certificate, you will receive a security warning each time you attempt to establish a secure connection to indymedia.org.uk. You can usually choose to ignore this warning and accept the server's certificate on a temporary or permanent basis.
"That doesn't sound so bad", you might say. In the past, this is exactly what many users have done in order to use secure connections. But there are major problems with this:
#If people get in the habit of approving new server certificates every time they get a security warning, it completely defeats the purpose of having certificates in the first place.
#indymedia.org.uk has several different servers and a different certificate for each one. It is easier for users to install CA Cert as a certificate authority once, rather than approving each certificate one at a time.
#indymedia.org.uk actively wants to spread the adoption of CA Cert as a certificate authority, because it is also being used (or will be) by other parts of the indymedia network as well as other activist collectives and groups around the world.
===I thought you were against authority?===
We are, but the internet is designed to require certificate authorities and there is not much we can do about it. There are other models for encrypted communication, such as the decentralized notion of a "web of trust" found in PGP. Unfortunately, no one has written any web browsers or mail clients to use PGP for establishing secure connections, so we are forced to rely on certificate authorities. Some day, we hope to collaborate with other tech collectives to create a certificate (anti) authority.
===What are the fingerprints of indymedia.org.uk's certificates?===
Some programs cannot use certificate authorities to confirm the validity of a certificate. In that case, you may need to manually confirm the fingerprint of the certificate. Here are some fingerprints for various certificates:
===Anonymous browsing: Tor===
Indymedia has in the past attracted the attention of authorities, that have occasionally tried to request logs of whom is accessing the web site and have in one occasion seized without any explanation our server. We believe in the right to anonymous political speech and therefore we do not keep logs that could provide any such information. Still, we advise indymedia readers that are concerned about the privacy of their reading and posting habits to hide them by using anonymizing services, like Tor or using SSL encrypted connections.
Tor - Anonymous browsing
Tor is a decentralized network of computers on the Internet that increases privacy in Web browsing, instant messaging, and other applications. We estimate there are some 30,000 Tor users currently, routing their traffic through about 200 volunteer Tor servers on five continents. Tor solves three important privacy problems: it prevents websites and other services from learning your location; it prevents eavesdroppers from learning what information you're fetching and where you're fetching it from; and it routes your connection through multiple Tor servers so no single server can learn what you're up to. Tor also enables hidden services, letting you run a website without revealing its location to users.
Individuals use Tor to keep websites from tracking them and their family members, or to connect to news sites, instant messaging services, or the like when these are blocked by their local Internet providers. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is backing Tor's development as a mechanism for maintaining civil liberties online. Corporations use Tor as a safe way to conduct competitive analysis. A branch of the U.S. Navy uses Tor for open source intelligence gathering, and one of its teams used Tor while deployed in the Middle East. This diversity of users helps to provide Tor's security.
Tor is free/open source software and unencumbered by patents. That means anyone can use it, anyone can improve it, and anyone can examine its workings to determine its soundness. It runs on all common platforms: Windows, OS X, Linux, BSD, Solaris, and more. Further, Tor has extensive protocol documentation, including a network-level specification that tells how to build a compatible Tor client and server; Dresden University in Germany has built a compatible client, and the European Union's PRIME project has chosen Tor to provide privacy at the network layer.
Of course, Tor isn't a silver bullet for anonymity. First, Tor only provides transport anonymity: it will hide your location, but what you say (or what your applications leak) can still give you away. Scrubbing proxies like Privoxy can help here by dealing with cookies, etc. Second, it doesn't hide the fact that you're *using* Tor: an eavesdropper won't know where you're going or what you're doing there, but she or he will know that you've taken steps to disguise this information, which might get you into trouble -- for example, Chinese dissidents hiding from their government might worry that the very act of anonymizing their communications will target them for investigation. Third, Tor is still under active development and still has bugs. And, since the Tor network is still relatively small, it's possible that a powerful attacker could trace users. Even in its current state, though, we believe Tor is much safer than direct connections.
Please help spread the word about Tor, and give the Tor developers feedback about how they can do more to get this tool into the hands of people who need it, and what changes will make it more useful. Also, consider donating your time and/or bandwidth to help make the Tor network more diverse and thus more secure. Wide distribution and use will give us all something to point to in the upcoming legal arguments as to whether anonymity tools should be allowed on the Internet.
* Participating With Safety -- how to use the Internet politically and safely.
* Choose good passwords and passphrases because if you don't your encryption will be easy to crack.
IMCUK, 02.01.2005 00:42</rev>